Bryn Mawr College

Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College
Philosophy Faculty Research and Scholarship
2021

Understanding realism
Collin Rice
Bryn Mawr College, crice3@brynmawr.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.brynmawr.edu/philosophy_pubs
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Custom Citation
Rice, C. 2021. "Understanding realism." Synthese 198: 4097–4121.

This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College.
https://repository.brynmawr.edu/philosophy_pubs/24
For more information, please contact repository@brynmawr.edu.

Philosophy

Understanding Realism
Collin Rice
Bryn Mawr College
Abstract. Catherine Elgin has recently argued that a nonfactive conception of understanding is
required to accommodate the epistemic successes of science that make essential use of idealizations
and models. In this paper, I argue that the fact that our best scientific models and theories are
pervasively inaccurate representations can be made compatible with a more nuanced form of
scientific realism that I call Understanding Realism. According to this view, science aims at (and
often achieves) factive scientific understanding of natural phenomena. I contend that this factive
scientific understanding is provided by grasping a set of true modal information about the
phenomenon of interest. Furthermore, contrary to Elgin’s view, I argue that the facticity of this kind
of scientific understanding can be separated from the inaccuracy of the models and theories used to
produce it.
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1. Introduction
Both philosophers of science and epistemologists have recently focused on the question of how
idealized scientific models can produce understanding (de Regt, Leonelli and Eigner 2009; Elgin
2017; Khalifa 2013, 2017; Kvanvig 2003; Mizrahi 2012; Potochnik 2017; Rice 2016; Schurz and
Lambert 1994; Strevens 2013). For example, in her new book True Enough, Catherine Elgin
argues that a nonfactive conception of understanding is required to accommodate the epistemic
achievements of science that make essential use of idealizations (Elgin 2017). In this paper, I
argue that the fact that our best scientific models and theories are pervasive distortions of real
systems can be made compatible with a more nuanced form of scientific realism that I call
Understanding Realism. The key to Understanding Realism is shifting realist views of science
away from focusing on whether scientific representations accurately represent relevant (e.g.
difference-making) features towards a defense of the facticity (or accuracy) of the understanding
that can be produced by using idealized theories and models in strategic ways.
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Philosophical discussions of scientific realism frequently focus exclusively on the truth or
accuracy of models or theories themselves rather than the truth, accuracy, or justification of the
body of scientific understanding produced by scientists’ use of those models and theories. I
contend that this focus is far too narrow for adequately evaluating the prospects for scientific
realism. Unfortunately, the debate over realism has been so focused on the truth and continuity
of (parts of) scientific theories that it has failed to even consider alternative ways that the
required truth and continuity might be achieved by scientific inquiry.
In order to move beyond traditional ways of framing the realism debate, I will grant that
our best scientific models and theories are pervasive misrepresentations of their real-world target
systems (Elgin 2017; Morrison 2015; Potochnik 2017; Rice 2017, 2018). That is, in agreement
with Elgin, I will grant that the representations produced by scientific inquiry are not true and do
not purport to be true (Elgin 2007, 2009, 2017). However, in contrast with Elgin, I then argue
that factive understanding is the primary epistemic goal of science and that this epistemic
achievement can be, and often is, accomplished by investigating and manipulating idealized
models and theories that fail to accurately represent the relevant features of their target systems
(Rice 2016).1 In order to appreciate how this could be so, philosophers must look at the
information that scientific communities extract from highly idealized models; e.g. by
manipulating and combining multiple models in various ways to discover modal information
about possible states of the system(s) of interest.
The following section draws out several mistaken assumptions that have dominated the
realism debate. Removing these assumptions makes room for a form of realism that is
compatible with our best models and theories being pervasively inaccurate representations. Next,

1

I do not claim that understanding is the only aim of science. I only claim that it is the primary epistemic aim that
realists should be concerned with.
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Section 3 lays out a factive account of scientific understanding in terms of providing correct
modal information about the phenomenon. Section 4 provides examples that demonstrate how
pervasively distorted models can be used to produce this kind of factive understanding. Then,
Section 5 explicitly lays out my Understanding Realism view. The final section concludes and
suggests that philosophers look more directly at the factive understanding produced by scientific
communities rather than focusing on the accuracy (or facticity) of the scientific representations
used to produce that understanding.

2. Realism, Accurate Representation, and Idealization
Traditionally, scientific realism claims that science aims at truth and that we have reason to
believe that our most successful scientific theories and models are true or approximately true
descriptions of the natural world (Kitcher 1993; Putnam 1975; Psillos 1999; Stanford 2006; van
Fraassen 1980). The main argument for realism—the so called ‘No Miracles Argument’—argues
that we are justified in believing our best scientific theories are accurate because this is the best
(or only) explanation of their ability to yield many successful predictions and interventions
(Putnam 1975). However, as opponents of realism have repeatedly argued, the history of science
shows that previously believed, but ultimately inaccurate theories, have also made accurate
predictions (Laudan 1981; Stanford 2006; van Fraassen 1980). What is more, several
philosophers have suggested that science’s widespread use of idealizations raises additional
problems for the realist (Cartwright 1983; McMullin 1985; Odenbaugh 2011; Psillos 2011;
Suárez 1999). The argument runs roughly as follows: given that we know scientific
representations include false assumptions, even if they make accurate predictions, we have no
reason to believe that they are true (or accurate) (see Odenbaugh 2011 for an example).
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These observations undermine the main argument that has been given for realism, but
they also perform another unintended function: they show that inaccurate models and theories
can accomplish many of the goals of science (Elgin 2017; Potochnik 2017; Strevens 2008;
Weisberg 2013). My thesis is that, in addition to being useful for prediction, pervasively
idealized models and theories can be used to produce factive understanding of real phenomena.
Moreover, I will argue that it is within these epistemic achievements that the truth or accuracy
the realist seeks is to be found rather than within the (partially) accurate representations of
scientific models or theories themselves. That is, we can be realists about the epistemic
achievements of scientific practice while granting that our best models and theories are
pervasively inaccurate descriptions of reality.
There are two main reasons this possibility has yet to be adequately explored. First, as I
noted above, the realism debate has been exclusively focused on the truth of scientific models
and theories themselves rather than on the corpus of understanding that scientific communities
can acquire from using idealized models and theories in strategic ways.2 A second reason this
possibility has yet to be adequately explored is that, throughout the literature, it is assumed that
the primary way that science produces understanding is by providing explanations (Friedman
1974; Salmon 1984; Strevens 2008). This claim is then coupled with the fact that most accounts
of explanation involve truth or accuracy requirements in order to conclude that the
representations scientists use to understand natural phenomena must be (at least partially)
accurate (de Regt and Gijsbers 2017).3

2

An important exception here is Potochnik (2017) that focuses on the way that diverse communities focused on
different causal patterns can produce understanding. However, Potochnik’s discussion never really addresses the
realism debate and, in contrast with the view I defend here, she argues that the understanding produced by science is
nonfactive.
3
Bas van Fraassen nicely summarizes this realist line of argument: “Science aims to find explanation, but nothing is
an explanation unless it is true (explanation requires true premises); so science aims to find true theories about what
the world is like. Hence scientific realism is correct” (van Fraassen 1980, 97). van Fraassen, of course, goes on to
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Indeed, ever since Hempel (1965) required that the propositions in the explanans be true,
most accounts have maintained that explanations must accurately describe the explanatorily
relevant features responsible for the explanandum. For example, mechanistic accounts of
explanation often endorse some kind of ‘model to mechanisms mapping’ requirement for models
to explain (Craver 2006; Craver and Darden 2013; Kaplan and Craver 2011). These accounts
then respond to the widespread use of idealization in science by suggesting that this observation,
[…] should not lead one to dispense with the idea that models can more or less accurately
represent features of the mechanism in the case at hand…These practices of abstraction and
idealization sit comfortably with the realist objectives of a mechanistic science. (Kaplan and
Craver 2011, 610)

In other words, we can respond to challenges to realism from idealization by showing that
idealized models can still provide partially accurate representations of their target
mechanism(s).4
Most causal accounts also build in accuracy requirements for models to explain. As
Michael Strevens puts it, “no causal account of explanation—certainly not the kairetic account—
allows nonveridical models to explain” (Strevens 2008, 297). While Strevens’s account does
allow some idealized models to explain, accurate representation continues to play a key role
since, “the overlap between an idealized model and reality...is a standalone set of differencemakers for the target” (Strevens 2008, 318). More generally, for causal accounts, in order for a
model to explain it must provide an accurate representation of (at least some of) the differencemaking causal relationships within the target system(s).
In light of these accurate representation requirements for explanation, most philosophers
have also maintained a factive (or veridicality) requirement for scientific understanding (de Regt

deny that in order to explain a theory must be true, but he is correct in characterizing the standard realist reasoning
as requiring that explanations be provided by true theories (or models).
4
More generally, for mechanistic accounts, “the goal is to describe correctly enough (to model or mirror more or
less accurately) the relevant aspects of the mechanisms under investigation” (Craver and Darden 2013, 94).
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2009; de Regt and Gijsbers 2017; Grimm 2008; Mizrahi 2012; Khalifa 2012, 2017; Kvanvig
2003, 2009; Strevens 2013). In fact, several philosophers have argued that scientific
understanding is only produced by grasping a correct explanation. For example, Strevens follows
J.D. Trout (2007) in claiming that, “An individual has scientific understanding of a phenomenon
just in case they grasp a correct scientific explanation of that phenomenon” (Strevens 2008, 3;
2013, 510). In addition, Jonathan Kvanvig tells us that, “understanding why something is the
case requires understanding that a certain explanation is correct” (Kvanvig 2003, 189-90).5
In general, most philosophical accounts claim that for idealized models to provide
genuine understanding (often by providing an explanation), the model must accurately represent
the important, significant, or difference-making features of the system that actually produced the
phenomenon of interest. These accurate representation requirements, however, conflict with the
observation that most of the idealized models used to explain and understand in science
pervasively distort their target systems—including the features that scientists know make a
difference to the phenomenon (Batterman and Rice 2014; Longino 2013; Potochnik 2017; Rice
2017, 2018). For example, models in physics distort the difference-making components and
interactions of fluids, magnets, and quantum dots (Batterman 2002; Batterman and Rice 2014;
Bokulich 2012; Morrison 2015), models in biology distort the difference-making processes of
drift and selection (Ariew et al. 2015; Morrison 2015; Potochnik 2017; Rice 2013, 2018), models
in economics distort the difference-making features of agents and transactions (Frigg 2010;
Knuuttila 2009), models in the study of human behavior distort difference-making genes and
environmental factors (Longino 2013), etc. The more general problem is that most of the

Moreover, Kvanvig claims that a key relationship between knowledge and understanding “is that both imply truth,
that both are factives. To say that a person understands that p therefore requires that p is true” (Kvanvig 2003, 190).
Stephen Grimm also suggests that, “our understanding of natural phenomena seems conspicuously factive—what we
are trying to grasp is how things actually stand in the world” (Grimm 2006, 518).
5
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idealizations used in scientific practice cannot be quarantined (or separated) from the parts of
science that are responsible for science’s epistemic successes (Elgin 2007, 2009, 2017;
Potochnik 2017; Rice 2018). As a result, the accurate representation relations that are required by
most realist approaches to science will fail to hold in most actual cases—even if we focus only
on known difference makers.6
What is more, very often in science we find multiple conflicting idealized models being
used to explain and understand the same phenomenon (Morrison 2011; Massimi 2018; Rice
2019; Weisberg 2013). When this occurs, a different, but related, epistemological problem arises
for the realist. In particular, if the realist is committed to endorsing the idea that the models
scientists use to understand must be accurate representations of difference makers, then these
uses of multiple conflicting models would seem to lead to the endorsement of inconsistent
metaphysical claims or the denial that such modeling can produce genuine understanding
(Massimi 2018; Rice 2019).7
I contend that realist approaches to science will continue to fall prey to the challenges
raised by pervasive idealization and the use of multiple conflicting models as long as
philosophical accounts continue to conflate the following two questions:
(1) How does the scientific model (or theory) allow scientists to genuinely understand
(perhaps by explaining) the phenomenon?
(2) Which of the relevant features (e.g. difference making causes) for the occurrence of the
phenomenon are accurately represented by the scientific model (or theory)?
As Markus Eronon and Raphael van Reil summarize the challenge: “On the one hand, understanding provided by
scientific models seems to be genuine understanding, but on the other hand, it often seems to be non-factive, as the
models involved are known to be literally false.” (Eronon and van Reil 2015, 3777).
7
Indeed, Michela Massimi (2018) has recently argued that the supposed incompatibility of the use of multiple
inconsistent models and realism depends on the implicit assumptions that the goal of modeling is “to establish a oneto-one mapping between relevant (partial) features of the model and relevant (partial) — actual or fictional — states
of affairs about the target system” (Massimi 2018, 342).
6
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In short, the problem is equating science’s understanding of a phenomenon with a model or
theory’s accurate representation of relevant features due to the truth and accuracy requirements
maintained by most accounts of explanation and understanding.
In contrast with these attempts to show that scientific understanding is factive, Elgin
(2007, 2017) argues that the pervasive use of idealizations shows us that only a nonfactive
conception of understanding can accommodate the epistemic achievements of science. On
Elgin’s view, “Effective models afford an understanding of their targets because their
simplifications, idealizations, elaborations, and distortions make salient important features of the
targets” (Elgin 2017, 249). Elgin’s justification for believing that idealized models are able to
produce nonfactive understanding relies heavily on the concept of exemplification.
Exemplification is a kind of instantiation of properties of the target system: “To exemplify, an
item must refer to the feature in question, and must do so via its instantiation of that feature”
(Elgin 2017, 185). Consequently, on Elgin’s account, “Idealizations are fictions expressly
designed to highlight subtle or obscure matters of fact. They do so by exemplifying features they
share with the facts” (Elgin 2007, 39). The crucial question is just how far of a departure this is
from the views described above given that exemplification still requires the model to share key
properties with real systems in order to generate understanding. In what follows, I disagree with
Elgin that being able to instantiate or approximate important features via exemplification is the
only way that models make features salient for purposes of understanding. While a scientific
model certainly “equips us to see the target differently than we otherwise might” (Elgin 2017,
263), this is often accomplished without regard to whether or not the salient features are
exemplified, instantiated, or accurately represented within the model. Moreover, I will argue that
the pervasive use of idealizations within scientific representations need not force us to adopt a
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nonfactive account of scientific understanding. As we will see below, by separating scientific
models (and theories) from the understanding scientists acquire by using those representations
we can see how inaccurate scientific representations can be used to improve our understanding—
even if we maintain factive requirements for understanding. First, however, we need an account
of the epistemic achievement of factive understanding.

3. Factive Understanding and Modal information
Within the epistemology literature, one of the main ways that understanding is distinguished
from knowledge is that, while knowledge seems to apply to individual propositions,
understanding is a cognitive relation to more extensive ‘bodies of information’ (Elgin 2007,
2017; Kvanvig 2003; Grimm 2006). As Kvanvig puts it, “Understanding requires the grasping of
explanatory and other coherence-making relationships in a large and comprehensive body of
information. One can know many unrelated pieces of information, but understanding is achieved
only when informational items are pieced together by the subject in question” (Kvanvig 2003,
192). Elgin agrees: “understanding is primarily a cognitive relation to a fairly comprehensive,
coherent body of information” (Elgin 2007, 35). For example, when we say that a person
understands the motion of the planets, they must grasp a fairly comprehensive body of
information about the planets along with various relationships between those pieces of
information.
In addition, the information and relations grasped about a phenomenon must be
incorporated into a larger body of information. Elgin puts the point this way: “The understanding
encapsulated in individual propositions derives from an understanding of larger bodies of
information that include those propositions.” (Elgin 2007, 35). Philosophers of science also
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suggest that “to understand a phenomenon P is to know how P fits into one’s background
knowledge” (Schurz and Lambert 1994, 67). In other words, in order to understand, an agent
needs to not only grasp various relations among the components of a body of information, but
those connections must also enable the agent to incorporate that information into their wider set
of background knowledge. Following these views, on the account I present here, scientific
understanding of a phenomenon requires that what one believes about the phenomenon, and the
relationships between those beliefs, must be systematically integrated into a wider body of
background information. Therefore, in order to understand a phenomenon, an agent must (1)
grasp the relations between a fairly comprehensive body of information about the phenomenon
and (2) see how that information is related to various pieces of their background knowledge.
Grasping these systematic relationships between information about the phenomenon (and one’s
other beliefs) is the ‘something further’ that must be grasped in order to genuinely understand.
This point about incorporation is important because it shows why scientific models are unable to
provide understanding in isolation.8 Instead, the information extracted from scientific models by
using them in various ways must also be incorporated into the scientist’s or the scientific
community’s overall body of information about the phenomenon.
The next question is, of course, just what information and relations must one grasp in
order to understand a phenomenon? I suggest that the primary source of scientific understanding
comes from grasping relationships of counterfactual dependence and independence among
various observable and unobservable features of the system and the phenomenon of interest
(Rice 2016, 2019). That is, understanding requires that one have a certain body of justified true
beliefs about the subject matter and be able to answer a range of what-if-things-had-been-

8

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to make this point clearer.
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different questions concerning changes to the features of the system(s) (Grimm 2006; Woodward
2003). In order to grasp these counterfactual dependencies and independencies, we need to see
how changes to the features of the system do or do not change the phenomenon of interest. This
requires that we have some sense of the modal space of possibilities and how the phenomenon
changes across that space.9 Providing accurate information about the phenomenon across a range
of possible situations shows us which features of the system are important (and unimportant) for
producing the phenomenon in the actual case—i.e. counterfactual information provides
information about the actual dependencies and independencies that hold in real systems.
However, we can only see these counterfactual dependencies and independencies by evaluating
contrastive situations where those feature are different. Consequently, I argue that the relevant
kind of relations that must be grasped within a coherent body of information in order to
scientifically understand a phenomenon are relationships of counterfactual dependence and
independence between features of the system and the phenomenon of interest. For example,
understanding planetary motion requires that one have a set of justified true beliefs about how
planets move and that one grasp how things would have been different had those facts been
different in various possible ways; e.g. had the earth had a much smaller mass. By grasping what
would occur in various counterfactual situations, scientists come to understand which features of
the system are important to the occurrence of the phenomenon and how the phenomenon
depends on those features.
One reason to focus on the modal information involved in understanding is that, while
explanations and understanding are importantly distinct (Lipton 2009; Rohwer and Rice 2016),

Soazig Le Bihan explicates this idea in more detail in terms of knowing “how to navigate some of the possibility
space associated with the phenomena (Le Bihan 2017, 112). Much of what follows is in agreement with that view
although I focus more on how idealized scientific models can provide the kind of modal information required to
understand.
9

11

the primary way science produces understanding is by developing explanations (Friedman 1974;
Salmon 1984; Strevens 2008). Consequently, the kind of information required for understanding
ought to be closely related to the information provided by scientific explanations. Indeed, as
Elgin notes, scientific understanding of natural phenomena “is the conception of understanding
that is closely connected with explanation” (Elgin 2007, 35).
Although I will not be arguing for any particular account of explanation here, it is widely
accepted that an important aspect of scientific explanations is that they provide a set of modal
information about how the features of the explanans relate to the explanandum (Bokulich 2008;
Craver 2007; Potochnik 2017; Rice 2013; Strevens 2008; Woodward 2003). Indeed, information
about counterfactual dependencies that hold in the system features prominently in causal
accounts of explanation (Potochnik 2017; Woodward 2003), noncausal accounts of explanation
(Reutlinger 2016; Rice 2013), statistical accounts of explanation (Ariew et al. 2015), and
structural accounts of explanation (Bokulich 2008, 2011, 2012). Almost all of these accounts
agree that, “[an] explanation must enable us to see what sort of difference it would have made for
the explanandum if the factors cited in the explanans had been different in various possible
ways” (Woodward 2003, 11). Consequently, we can see why explanations are such a good
source of understanding: they provide a large amount of the modal information about the space
of possibilities involved in understanding a phenomenon.
Moreover, I suggest that the more modal information one grasps about the possible states
of the target phenomenon, the better one understands the phenomenon.10 The kind of possibility
of interest to scientists will be different in different context (e.g. logical possibility vs. biological
possibility), but I suggest that learning about how the phenomenon would or would not be

10

There are, of course, other ways to improve one’s understanding as well.
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different in various possible counterfactual situations always improves one’s understanding. This
highlights another important feature of understanding: unlike knowledge or explanation,
understanding seems to clearly come in degrees (Kvanvig 2003; Elgin 2017).11 For example,
some people understand a subject matter better than others. This feature of understanding is
important for two reasons. First, it suggests that there might be degrees of understanding that fall
below the understanding provided by having a complete explanation (Lipton 2009; Rohwer and
Rice 2013, 2016). In science, this allows for the improvement of understanding without requiring
that scientists be able to provide an explanation.12 The second important thing about
understanding coming in degrees is that understanding of a phenomenon might be improved
beyond the understanding provided by an explanation. One way this can happen is when
scientists provide multiple explanations for the same phenomenon (Bokuich 2018; Longino
2013; Massimi 2018; Morrison 2015; Potochnik 2017). In other cases, models that fail to explain
might deepen our understanding beyond what our current explanations can provide (Rohwer and
Rice 2013, 2016). The general point is that the degree of understanding science has about a
phenomenon neither starts nor stops with the understanding provided by a single explanation.
We can now turn to the question of whether or not understanding is factive and, if so,
what about the grasped body of information needs to be true (or accurate) in order for us to
genuinely understand? As we saw earlier, the serious issue here is that much of the
understanding produced by science depends, in essential ways, on idealizations that are known to

11

While explanations might be better or worse, or perhaps can be deepened, whether or not an explanation has been
provided is typically treated as a threshold concept.
12
This idea runs contrary to recent accounts that have claimed that the only way to understand a phenomenon is to
grasp a correct explanation of the phenomena (Trout 2002; Strevens 2013). See Lipton (2009) or Rice (2016) for
reasons to doubt that explanation is the only way to provide understanding.
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be false. One way to try and accommodate this observation is to restrict the false assumptions to
the periphery of our understanding. For example, Kvanvig suggests:
[S]uppose that the false beliefs concern matters that are peripheral rather than central to the subject
matter…When the falsehoods are peripheral, we can ascribe understanding based on the rest of the
information grasped that is true and contains no falsehoods…In this way, the factive character of
understanding can be preserved without having to say that a person with false beliefs about a subject
matter can have no understanding of it. (Kvanvig 2003, 201-202).

This is similar to Strevens’s requirement that understanding be provided by a correct explanation
that provides an accurate description of the difference-making causes of the phenomenon
(Strevens 2008, 2013). This allows idealizations to distort features that are irrelevant or make no
difference to the phenomenon of interest. The problem with this suggestion is that essential
idealization of difference-makers is often absolutely central to the models and theories scientists
use to understand various phenomena. As Elgin notes, in science, “elimination of idealizations is
not a desideratum. Nor is consigning them to the periphery of a theory” (Elgin 2007, 38). Indeed,
the literature on scientific modeling reveals myriad examples in which idealizations play
ineliminable and central roles within scientists’ attempts to explain and understand the
phenomena we observe (Batterman 2002; Batterman and Rice 2014; Morrison 2015; Potochnik
2017; Rice 2017, 2018).
Another issue with Kvanvig’s suggestion is that idealizations are rarely believed by the
scientists that use them. This goes back to the earlier point that most accounts seem to conflate
the idealized model itself with being an explanation or providing understanding on its own. If
this is so, and idealizations are central to those models, then the idealizations will be central to
our understanding. Moreover, when scientist make use of multiple conflicting idealized models
to investigate the same phenomenon, this would result in our understanding including multiple
conflicting claims about the phenomenon. However, I think it is a mistake to assume that all the
assumptions of the idealized models used within science are automatically constituents of
14

science’s understanding of a phenomenon. Instead, “It is only through the use of models, or
indeed any other kind of object or representation, that scientists acquire understanding of the
world” (de Regt, Leonelli and Eigner 2009, 12). As a result, I argue that the modal information
required to understand a phenomenon is typically strategically extracted from the use of
idealized models. This means that not every idealization used in the production of scientific
understanding need be included in the understanding scientists have of a phenomenon—even if
those idealizations were essential to producing that understanding.
Still, there is a sense in which our account of understanding ought to accommodate the
idea that scientists might unknowingly believe some falsehoods or distortions without
undermining the facticity of their understanding.13 Indeed, the history of science clearly shows
that unknowingly believing some falsehoods is common within scientific practice.
In light of this, my view is that understanding is factive because in order to genuinely
understand a phenomenon most of what the agent (or community) believes about the
phenomenon and the counterfactual dependencies and independencies that hold between features
of real systems and that phenomenon must be true (Rice 2016, 2019). This does not mean that
determining if an agent understands requires determining whether the percentage of true beliefs
within their understanding meets some universally applicable threshold (e.g. eighty percent). For
one thing, in different contexts, some pieces of information will be more important (or salient) to
one’s understanding and so the correctness of those beliefs will carry more weight in determining
whether one’s understanding meets this factive requirement. Other issues concern cases where
one’s beliefs are only approximately true or are inferred from other false beliefs. These issues

13

Indeed, if someone had an extensive set of justified true beliefs about the Roman Empire (and various related
counterfactual situations), but also believed that Rome was currently on the northern border of Italy, we would not
thereby claim that they failed to understand the subject matter at all—although their understanding might be
improved by correcting this false belief.
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suggest that the factive component of understanding will have to be somewhat context sensitive
and allow for the possibility that one who understands might believe some (central) falsehoods
about the phenomenon.
Nonetheless, I contend that the body of information that constitutes science’s
understanding will often be ‘true enough’ for us to maintain that genuine understanding requires
meeting a factive requirement. For example, scientists’ understanding of the movement of
planets seems to clearly meet this factive requirement since—although it may contain some false
beliefs—it is mostly constituted by true beliefs and those beliefs are particularly salient in the
context of inquiry; e.g. where the earth is, how planets rotate, which bodies orbit which others,
and the elliptical shape of the orbits. Moreover, scientists’ understanding of this phenomenon
also includes a plethora of correct information about how planetary motion would be different in
a range of counterfactual situations; e.g. if the earth’s orbit were altered or the earth’s mass had
been different. If scientists were systematically wrong about these salient facts or counterfactual
situations, then they would fail to understand the phenomenon. Yet, given that most of their
beliefs about planetary motion and how changes to the features of the system would change it are
true, we ought to conclude that scientists do genuinely understand a great deal about planetary
motion. This conception of understanding is still conspicuously factive since truth continues to
play a key role in our judgments about whether or not we genuinely understand.
Here it is worth highlighting an important contrast between my view and the view
defended by Elgin. Because Elgin’s view requires exemplification, her view fails to
accommodate cases in which drastic distortion of the salient features is used to further our
understanding. The problem is that, as Elgin herself suggests, “Many scientific models such as
equations and diagrams, are incapable of instantiating the properties they apparently impute to
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their targets. If they cannot instantiate a range of properties, they cannot exemplify them.” (Elgin
2017, 258). Elgin’s response to this objection is that these models are often true enough for
purposes of understanding “because the models are approximately true, or because they diverge
from truth in irrelevant respects, or because the range of cases for which they are not true is a
range of cases we do not care about” (Elgin 2017, 261). This is fairly close to the suggestion
made by Strevens and others that idealized models can be used to produce understanding as long
as their idealizations only distort irrelevant or negligible features. In contrast, I argue that
idealized models that are used to produce understanding are often not approximately true and
distort significant difference-making features that the researchers take to be relevant. Therefore, I
argue that limiting the contributions scientific models make to understanding to the features they
(approximately) exemplify or instantiate is too narrow. Features can be emphasized,
deemphasized, and learned about via the use of scientific representations without having to
accurately represent, exemplify, or approximate those features.
Another key difference with Elgin is that, while she takes the central role of idealization
in science to require a nonfactive conception of understanding, I maintain that the central role of
idealization in the extraction of modal information is compatible with a factive conception of the
understanding produced by science. The key to recognizing this possibility is to separate the
assumptions of idealized scientific representations from the modal information extracted from
scientists’ strategic use of those representations. I will provided some more detailed examples of
how this can occur in the next section.
Let me now state my account of understanding more explicitly. Factive scientific
understanding of a phenomenon is achieved when an agent (or community) grasps some correct
modal information about the counterfactual dependencies and independencies that hold between
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features of the system and the phenomenon and the agent (or community) grasps how that modal
information can be systematically incorporated into a larger body of information in which most
of what they believe about the phenomenon is true (Rice 2016). It is important to note that this
account leaves open the possibility that some (and perhaps central) propositions of the
representations that contribute to one’s understanding might be false or inaccurate. Moreover, on
this account, the more accurate modal information that is grasped about how changes in the
features of the system would result in changes in the phenomenon, the better (or deeper) one’s
understanding of that phenomenon.

4. Extracting Modal Information from Highly Idealized Models
Using the above account of factive understanding, in this section I use examples from scientific
practice to argue that factive understanding can be produced by (multiple conflicting) idealized
models that inaccurately represent most of the features of their target system(s)—including
features that are known to make a difference to the phenomenon of interest. This understanding
is constituted by modal information regarding how changes in the observable and unobservable
features of the system would result in changes in the phenomenon. This information is revealed
by investigating various possible states of the target system(s) that illustrate how the
phenomenon would have been different if various features of the system had been (perhaps
radically) different then they are in the actual case. The examples provided here also illustrate
how the assumptions of idealized models can be distinguished from the understanding extracted
by scientists’ use of those models.

4.1. Example #1: The Exploration of Possibilities
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One way that idealized models that distort difference-making features can produce understanding
is by using the model to demonstrate how something is possible by modeling a hypothetical (but
nonactual) system (Lipton 2009; Nozick 1981, 12; Weisberg 2013). That is, the model is used to
extract information about how the phenomenon counterfactually depends (or fails to depend) on
various features of the system by investigating a merely possible system that shows how
changing the actual features of the system result in changes in the phenomenon of interest. As
Lipton suggests, in these cases “the kind of understanding gained is modal, but here what is
gained is knowledge of possibility” (Lipton 2009, 49). Indeed, since grasping modal information
about the possible states of the system provides understanding, exploring nonactual possible
systems can produce understanding without aiming to accurately represent the features of any
real-world system.
An example of this kind of modeling is the use of the Hardy-Weinberg model in
population genetics (Morrison 2015; Hartwell et al. 2000; Relethford 2012). This highly
idealized model represents the change in the distribution of alleles in an infinite population of
organisms that mate randomly and are not subject to migration or mutation (Relethford 2012;
Stoneking 2017). This is a rather drastic distortion of the causes and processes that biologists
know make a difference to actual evolutionary outcomes. No population is infinite and this
assumption distorts the processes that result in drift (and selection) within real biological
populations. Furthermore, all populations are subject to a plethora of other evolutionary
influences such as selection, mutation, and migration, but each of these is distorted (or simply
ignored) within the Hardy-Weinberg model. In addition, the Hardy-Weinberg model assumes
that there is no intergenerational overlap. However, this is false of (almost) every real-world
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population and is a difference-making feature for many evolutionary outcomes (Levy 2011;
Morrison 2015; Stoneking 2017).
The model does, however, demonstrate that in such a hypothetical (i.e. possible) system,
one generation of random mating will produce a distribution of genotypes that is solely a
function of the allele frequencies in the previous generation. Moreover, the model shows that this
distribution will be stable in future generations provided that the above assumptions are held
constant. More specifically, the model tells us that if we have a pair of alleles, A1 and A2, at a
particular locus and in the initial population the ratio of A1 to A2 is p to q, the distribution for all
succeeding generations will be:
p2A1A1 + 2pqA1A2 + q2A2A2
regardless of the distribution of genotypes in the initial generation. By idealizing most of the
influences on the population’s evolution, the model allows one to calculate the genotype
frequencies after a round of random mating simply by knowing the allele frequencies in the
previous generation.
Despite its myriad distortions of difference-making features of actual biological
populations: “The Hardy-Weinberg law enables us to understand fundamental features of
heredity and variation…Hence, the claim that the law is false in some sense misses the point if
our concern is understanding and conveying information” (Morrison 2009, 133). The key
question is exactly how the model is able to produce this understanding of variation and heredity
in actual biological populations.
One way the Hardy-Weinberg model produces understanding is showing how it is
possible for variation to be maintained across generations within a Mendelian framework. This
result is important because before demonstrating the stability of the distribution of genotypes,
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Darwinians believing that blending inheritance would lead to decreased variation in each
successive generation. This was problematic because natural selection requires variation. The
Hardy-Weinberg model answers the question, “How is it possible for the genetic structure to be
maintained over successive generations?” (Morrison 2009, 134). This insight provides correct
information about a modal possibility that is relevant to understanding how actual biological
systems evolve. What is more, these results concerning how the biological population would
behave in a radically different possible system help scientists see how changing various
observable and unobservable features of the real system would result in changes in the
phenomenon. This modal information concerning how changes in these features result in
changes in the phenomenon can then be incorporated into a larger body of information that
constitutes the scientific communities’ overall understanding of evolutionary phenomena. Since
most of this information—as well as the modal information provided by investigating the HardyWeinberg model—is correct, we can see how the model contributes factive understanding of real
biological phenomena despite its being pervasively idealized.
Rather than being an isolated case, the Hardy-Weinberg model is part of a large class of
biological models that produce understanding by drastically distorting the evolutionary processes
of real populations. Other examples include the Hawk-Dove model or the Prisoner’s dilemma
(Rohwer and Rice 2016). These models produce understanding not by accurately representing
the features of actual systems, but by modeling systems that are merely (biologically) possible.
Indeed: “Selectionists have devoted a great deal of effort to the construction of models that are
aimed at demonstrating that some observed or suspected phenomena are possible, that is, that
they are compatible with the established or confirmed biological hypotheses” (Beckner 1968,
165). The key in these cases is that models that represent possible (but non-actual) systems can
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still provide correct modal information by showing how the phenomenon in question could have
arisen (Lipton 2009, 51). By answering questions about the possibility space of the phenomenon,
the model provides true modal information about the features of biological populations despite
its drastic distortion of the difference-making features of all real biological populations. By
incorporating this modal information into a larger body of information about how biological
populations evolve, scientists come to (better) understand heredity and the transmission of
variation.
Elgin discusses the understanding produced by the HW-model somewhat differently:
The Hardy-Weinberg model…exemplifies the pattern in the redistribution of the alleles in the
absence of evolutionary pressures. Inasmuch as evolutionary pressures are always present, the
model cannot, nor does it pretend to, account for allele distribution more generally. It is, however,
very useful for some purposes. If population geneticists want to understand how significant an
evolutionary factor such as migration is, they need a base rate. They need, that is, to know how
alleles would redistribute in its absence (Elgin 2017, 263).14

However, it is a bit unclear how, on Elgin’s view, exemplifying a pattern that fails to occur in
any actual system is able to produce understanding. That is, the Hardy-Weinberg model fails to
exemplify the salient features of any real-world biological population. Therefore, it is unclear
how Elgin’s view, based on exemplification of the features of real systems, is able to show how
the Hardy-Weinberg model produces understanding. In contrast, I have argued that the HardyWeinberg model produces factive understanding of real biological phenomena because it enables
biologists to grasp true model information about how the system would behave had various real
features been (drastically) different in the ways represented by the model. In other words, the
Hardy-Weinberg model produces understanding not because it exemplifies or accurately
represents the features of real biological populations, but because it provides true information
about how changing the features of real systems would change the dynamics of the population.

This is very close to de Regt and Gijsbers’s (2017) idea that non-veridical models can promote understanding by
being useful for moving science forward.
14
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This understanding is produced by investigating a merely possible system in order to show how
changing the features of real biological populations would result in changes in the phenomenon
of interest.

4.2. Example #2: Multiple Conflicting Models and Overall Understanding
As we saw above, a major challenge for realist (or factivist) approaches to science comes from
the use of multiple inconsistent models to understand the same phenomenon (Massimi 2018;
Morrison 2011, 2015; Rice 2019). Across many sciences, multiple conflicting scientific
representations are required to provide a complete understanding of a phenomenon (Green
2013). These models typically provide incompatible representations of the difference-making
features of their target system(s). Thus, if we required models that are used to understand (or
explain) to accurately represent difference makers, then the realist would be forced to either
endorse incompatible claims about the features of the target system or deny that such cases can
produce genuine understanding. Elgin’s view based on exemplification also seems to face a
challenge here. When models provide genuinely inconsistent representations of the salient
features of their target systems, it is unclear how we can interpret the understanding these models
provide in terms of exemplification of salient features. After all, the models each describe those
features in contradictory and idealized ways. The way around these issues, I propose, is to see
how each of the conflicting models can contribute to scientists’ overall understanding of the
phenomenon by providing accurate modal information without having to accurately represent or
exemplify the features of their target system(s).
As an example, scientists make use of multiple inconsistent models to study the nucleus
(Morrison 2011). In fact, there are over thirty different nuclear models, each of which provides
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insight into some aspects of nuclear structure and dynamics. What is troubling for the realist is
that the set of assumptions made by any one of these models is in conflict with fundamental
claims made by the others. For example, “some models assume that nucleons move
approximately independently in the nucleus … while others characterize the nucleons as strongly
coupled due to their strong short range interactions” (Morrison 2011, 347). In other words, the
models scientists use to study the nucleus routinely provide idealized representations that are
inconsistent with one another regarding precisely those features that scientists take to be most
salient. As Morrison explains, “nuclear spin, size, binding energy, fission and several other
properties of stable nuclei are all accounted for using models that describe one and the same
entity (the nucleus) in different and contradictory ways” (Morrison 2011, 349). The challenge, of
course, is seeing how such a conflicting set of idealized models can yield (factive)
understanding.
I suggest that the realist ought to reject the assumption that accurate representation (or
exemplification) is essential to interpreting these idealized models as providing genuine factive
understanding. Instead, I argue that we should interpret these various nuclear models as
capturing different pieces of modal information about nuclear behaviors across different ranges
of perturbations to the physical features of nuclear systems (Rice 2019). That is, these models
produce understanding by modeling different ranges of possible systems that illustrate how
changing (different) features of the actual system(s) would result in changes in the phenomena of
interest. For example, the liquid-drop model captures one set of true modal information about
nuclear phenomena by looking at a certain set of possible systems that change certain features of
real systems, whereas the shell model might capture another set of true modal information about
nuclear phenomena by looking at a different set of possible systems in which different real
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features are altered, and so on for the other models. The general idea is that conflicting models
can be used to extract different sets of modal information about the nucleus without having to
interpret any one of the models as an accurate representation of the actual features of real nuclear
systems. Indeed, while no single model is able to account for all the features of nuclear
phenomena, these models have provided “an explanatory foundation for understanding certain
processes” (Morrison 2011, 350). I argue that this is because multiple conflicting idealized
models can be used to produce different sets of counterfactual dependence information about the
target system despite the inaccuracy of the models used to extract that modal information. This
counterfactual dependence information about how changes to the features of the system would
change the phenomenon can then constitute a coherent (and consistent) body of information
about the phenomenon even if the models used to explore those possibilities represent
incompatible systems. Just because the representations of the liquid drop model and the shell
model are incompatible does not entail that the counterfactual dependencies the liquid drop
model reveals about real systems will conflict with the counterfactual dependencies revealed by
the shell model. The modal information extracted from these multiple conflicting models can
then be incorporated into physicists’ overall body of information concerning nuclear
phenomenon, which is constituted by mostly true beliefs about the nature of the nucleus and how
changing the features of the nucleus would result in changes to various phenomena that are of
interest to physicists. As a result, the use of multiple conflicting models can improve scientists’
body of factive understanding even if none of the models provides an accurate representation of
the difference-making features of real systems in which that phenomenon occurs.
Elgin addresses this case quite differently. She says:
…if what one model highlights is that in some significant respects the nucleus behaves like a liquid
drop, and another model highlights that in some other significant respects it behaves as though it
has a shell structure, there is in principle no problem. There is no reason why the same thing should
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not share some significant properties with liquid drops and other significant properties with rigid
shells. (Elgin 2017, 270)

While this is somewhat helpful in moving us away from focusing on accurate representation
relations, Elgin’s proposal requires that the features these models enable us understand ought to
be exemplified (i.e. instantiated) in some way. That is, what the models enable us to understand
must be what each model has in common with the actual systems. This works fine when the
salient features involved in the understanding provided by one model are sufficiently different
and separable from the features involved in the understanding provide by another model. The
issue is that in many instances—including the multiple conflicting models of the nucleus—this
assumption cannot be made. As Morrison notes, cases in which different aspects of the
phenomenon can be investigated by idealizing the system in different ways are importantly
different from cases of genuinely inconsistent models like those in the nuclear modeling case. In
this case, each of the models “makes very different assumptions about exactly the same thing”
(Morrison 2011, 347). As a result, we cannot interpret these cases as merely exemplifying
different aspects of the phenomena of interest. Instead, these models provide contradictory
representations of the same features of the system in order to explore alternative possible states
of the system. By seeing how exploring these various contradictory possibilities can produce
understanding of the actual phenomenon via the extraction of modal information, we can see
how scientists have developed a large body of factive understanding of nuclear phenomena
despite the fact that the models used to produce that understanding fail to accurately represent or
exemplify the salient features of real systems.

5. Understanding Realism
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In light of the above discussion, I contend that the use of pervasively inaccurate representations
in science can be made compatible with a version of realism that I call Understanding Realism.
According to this view, the primary epistemic aim of science is factive understanding and this
aim can be, and often has been, accomplished by the use of models (and theories) that
inaccurately represent most of the features of their target system(s) (Potochnik 2017; Rice 2016,
2019). The key is noting that the understanding provided by scientists’ use of idealized models
ought to be separated from the representational accuracy of the models and theories used to
produce that understanding. According to Understanding Realism, factive understanding of
natural phenomena is provided by the correct modal information extracted from idealized
models. Importantly, this means that the plethora of modal information included in scientists’
understanding of various phenomena need not include the inconsistent assumptions included in
the various (conflicting) idealized models used to study those phenomena. In short, the grasping
of the modal information required to understand natural phenomena can be separated from the
detailed assumptions involved in constructing the various idealized model systems used to
extract that information.
Distinguishing the understanding provided by models from the assumptions of the
models themselves allows us to maintain a factive conception of scientific understanding despite
the central use of idealization in science. In contrast, Elgin argues against any kind of veritism
that takes truth to be necessary for epistemic success, since “if we accept it, we cannot do justice
to the epistemic achievements of science” (Elgin 2017, 9). Specifically, Elgin argues that “The
more serious problem comes with the laws, models, and idealizations that are acknowledged not
to be true but that are nonetheless critical to, indeed at least partially constitutive of, the
understanding that science delivers” (Elgin 2017, 14). While I am sympathetic with many
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aspects of Elgin’s views, I disagree with the claim that the understanding produced by scientific
inquiry must be partially constituted by (all of) the idealizations used in science. Although
theories, models, and idealizations are certainly the tools with which scientists produce
understanding of various phenomena, it does not directly follow that the assumptions involved in
those tools must be included in the understanding extracted from scientists’ uses of those tools. If
this separation between the representations used by scientists and the understanding provided by
scientific inquiry is possible, then recognizing the central role of (multiple conflicting) idealized
models in science need not force us to adopt a nonfactive conception of scientific understanding.
Indeed, the account defended above maintains the requirement that the modal information used
to understand a phenomenon must be constituted by mostly true beliefs about how changing the
observable and unobservable features of the system would change the phenomenon without
requiring that the models used to produce that understanding be accurate representations of the
relevant features of their target system(s).
In line with this account of understanding, I contend that realist approaches to science
ought to focus their attention on science’s ability to provide factive understanding of patterns of
counterfactual dependence and independence rather than on the truth or accuracy of our best
theories and models themselves. Despite their drastic distortion of the features of real systems,
scientific models can provide a wide range of true modal information about the counterfactual
relevance and irrelevance of various features of real systems to the occurrence of natural
phenomena (Batterman and Rice 2014; Massimi 2018; Rice 2013, 2016, 2017). Moreover, by
building multiple conflicting models that explore different possible states of the system,
scientists can extract a plethora of modal information that can be used to better understand the
phenomenon (perhaps in a variety of ways). As a result, realists can claim that science is able to
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achieve the epistemic success of factive understanding despite the fact that scientific models are
typically highly idealized and conflict with one another. In fact, the above account suggests that
realists ought to encourage such a proliferation of conflicting models since they will typically
provide access to a wider range of modal information and, therefore, will provide more overall
understanding than any single model (or perspective).
Before moving forward, it is important to look at what this view has in common with
other (more traditional) kinds of realism. Indeed, given that Understanding Realism denies one
of the central tenets of realism—that our scientific models and theories are accurate descriptions
of real world phenomena—it is worth taking a moment to consider why the above position ought
to be considered a kind of realism. Moreover, given that I have argued that scientific models and
theories are tools with which scientists extract modal information, one might think
Understanding Realism has more in common with instrumentalism than realism.15
However, while I have argued that scientific models are tools that are used to extract
information, a key difference between this view and instrumentalism concerns what scientists are
able to use the models to produce. For the instrumentalist, the results are either accurate
prediction or empirical adequacy regarding observable features of the phenomenon (van
Fraassen 1980). In contrast, Understanding Realism argues that scientific models and theories
can be used to produce the epistemic achievement of factive understanding which requires much
more than mere accurate prediction of observable features. In particular, the model must enable
us to see how various changes to the observable and unobservable features of the real system(s)
would result in changes in the phenomenon of interest. The important point is that this factive
epistemic achievement requires accurate information about counterfactual dependencies that

15

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to make the connection with realism and the distinction with
instrumentalism clearer here.
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hold between actual features of the system(s) and the predicted outcome—dependencies that will
often hold between unobservables and the target phenomenon. This goes well beyond merely
‘saving the phenomenon’ or being accurate regarding only observable aspects of real systems. In
short, while scientific models and theories are instruments, according to Understanding Realism,
they are instruments for producing factive understanding which requires much more than
empirical adequacy. Most importantly, the modal information involved in scientists’
understanding of natural phenomena will (typically) be partially constituted by accurate
information about unobservables and their dependence relations with the phenomenon of
interest.
In addition, the view defended here has much in common with traditional forms of
realism in terms of what it claims about the epistemic aims of science, the role of truth in those
epistemic aims, and our being justified in believing that (our current) science has in fact achieved
those epistemic aims. One way of thinking about the realism debate is as a debate about the aims
of science and the epistemic achievements we are justified in believing scientific inquiry has
accomplished (e.g. understanding of unobservables vs. empirical adequacy). The problem, I’ve
argued, is that most realist accounts have assumed that the accomplishment of the realist’s
epistemic aims necessarily requires the development of true (or approximately true) theories or
models. I think scientific practice makes clear that the epistemic achievements of science are
accomplished via models and theories that drastically distort real systems. However, we can still
be realists (of a sort) if we shift our consideration of these epistemic aims of science away from
the theories and models themselves towards the modal information extracted from the use of
those representations. By focusing on these epistemic achievements directly, we can see that,
while it denies one of the central tenets of traditional accounts of realism, Understanding
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Realism still makes several realist claims about the aims and epistemic accomplishments of
scientific practice.
First, my account argues that the aim of scientific inquiry is factive understanding. This
means that science still aims at truth in an important way. Some philosophers have interpreted
the reliance on essential idealizations as requiring the claim that science does not aim for truth or
that science only aims for nonfactive epistemic achievements (Elgin 2017; Potochnik 2017). In
contrast, I have argued that, despite the use of drastically distorted models and theories, science
aims to uncover correct modal information about the counterfactual dependencies and
independencies that obtain in the real world. In other words, the aim of facticity with respect to
the epistemic achievements of science is consistent with the widespread use of grossly inaccurate
scientific representations.
Second, the above account holds that the factive understanding science aims at includes
lots of accurate information about unobservable entities and their relationships to observable
phenomena. That is, it isn’t just that these models and theories can be used to make accurate
predictions of observable features, but that they can be used to extract true modal information
about various observable and unobservable features of the system and how changes in those
features would (or would not) change the results. This means that the epistemic aims of science
often include providing accurate information about unobservables much like traditional accounts
of realism.
Finally, Understanding Realism still maintains that we are justified in believing much of
what science’s factive understanding tells us about the operations of unobservable entities and
their features even if we are not justified in believing the models and theories used to generate
that understanding. That is, we are still justified in believing much of the information science has
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provided about the nature of unobservable entities, processes, and features of real systems—that
information is just contained in scientists’ understanding of the phenomenon rather than being
accurately reflected or mirrored by the representations used to discover that information.
In sum, Understanding Realism counts as a kind of realism because it: (1) makes a claim
about the epistemic aims of science involving truth, (2) includes unobservable entities and their
features within those truths that science aims at, and (3) makes a claim about science’s epistemic
successes in terms of achieving factive understanding of many natural phenomena. The mistake
of traditional accounts of realism has been assuming that these factive epistemic aims must be
achieved via (or within) true or accurate models and theories. By showing that these factive
epistemic achievements can be accomplished by other means, we can preserve the realist’s
commitments regarding the aims and achievements of science without having to show that our
models and theories accurately represent reality.
The most pressing issue for Understanding Realism is to show why we are justified in
believing the counterfactual dependence (and independence) information we extract from
scientific models given that we know those models are inaccurate representations. In response, I
suggest that instead of relying on accurate representation or exemplification of differencemaking features, realist approaches to science ought to appeal to the exploration of non-actual
possibilities and the fact that many patterns of counterfactual dependence are universal across
drastically different systems (Batterman and Rice 2014; Bokulich 2008, 2011; Morrison 2015;
Rice 2017, 2018, 2019).
In many cases, such as the Hardy-Weinberg model, the justification for trusting the
modal information extracted from the idealized model is that the model represents a highly
idealized non-actual system that changes many of the features we know are present in real
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systems. As a result, despite failing to exemplify or accurately represent the features of real
biological populations, the Hardy-Weinberg model can show how changes to the actual features
of the system would result in changes in the evolutionary dynamics of the population. This
modal information is true and reveals important information about the dependence relations that
hold within real systems. This is accomplished by constructing a model of a hypothetical
scenario that changes the features of the real systems in particular ways and looking at the results
when certain key features (e.g. migration, mutation, drift, etc.) are absent or altered.
In the second case, multiple conflicting models are used to extract modal information by
having each of the models display different sets of counterfactual dependence relationships that
are present in the real-world system. For example, the liquid drop model might display certain
counterfactual dependencies present in real nuclear systems and the shell model might display
some other counterfactual dependence relations between different features of the real system and
the phenomenon of interest. Physicists’ concept of a universality class becomes particular useful
in such cases where the model(s) and the target system(s) are claimed to display similar patterns
of counterfactual dependence despite the drastic distortions involved in each of the models. The
term ‘universality’ is just an expression of the fact that many systems that are perhaps extremely
heterogeneous in their physical features will nonetheless display similar patterns of behavior
(Batterman 2002; Kadanoff 2013; Morrison 2015). The systems that display similar patterns of
behavior despite differences in their physical features are said to be in the same universality class
(Kadanoff 2013).16 Physicists’ interest in universality has typically focused on patterns that are
stable across extremely diverse real systems; e.g. the universality of critical exponents across a
wide range of fluids and magnets (Batterman 2002). However, I argue that scientists also use

As physicist Leo Kadanoff puts it, “Whenever two systems show an unexpected or deeply rooted identity of
behavior they are said to be in the same universality class” (Kadanoff 2013, 178).
16
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universality classes to find model systems that display similar patterns of counterfactual
dependence to those found in real systems despite rather drastic differences in their features
(Rice 2017, 2018).17 Thomas Gisiger explains how this works in physics:
Universality has been described as a physicist’s dream come true. Indeed, what it tells us is that a
system, whether it is a sample in a laboratory or a mathematical model, is very insensitive to details
of its dynamics…From a theoretical point of view, to study a given physical system, one only has
to consider the simplest mathematical model possibly conceivable in the same universality class.
(Gisiger 2001, 173)

After reviewing how this works in physics, Gisiger then argues that when it comes to modeling
complex systems in biology, “One only has to choose a simple, or simplistic, model in the same
universality class as the system under study” (Gisiger 2001, 175).
When an idealized model system is within the same universality class as its target
system(s), the model will display similar patterns of counterfactual dependence and
independence despite the fact that the model may drastically distort the causes, mechanisms, or
other features responsible for the phenomenon in real-world systems. For example, physicists
have discovered that, despite drastic differences in their molecular details, a wide range of fluids
display the same phase transition behaviors near their critical points (Batterman 2002). What is
more, physicists have discovered that these same universal patterns are displayed by highly
idealized models that look nothing like the real fluids whose behavior they are used to
investigate (Batterman and Rice 2014). Despite these distortions, by delimiting the universality
class of systems—which includes the idealized model systems—that display these universal
patterns, physicists have discovered that these behaviors counterfactually depend on various
features of real systems; e.g. the order parameter of the system. Moreover, physicists have used
various mathematical modeling techniques such as the renormalization group to demonstrate that
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I refer to a model system as the abstract system represented by a scientific model that includes all and only the
features specified by the model (within a particular modeling context).
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most of the other features of these systems could be changed (or perturbed) without altering the
critical behaviors of the system. All of this is accomplished without constructing a model that
accurately represents or exemplifies difference makers. By identifying universal patterns of
behavior, scientists can link the modal information extracted from their investigations of
idealized models with patterns of counterfactual dependence and independence present in real
systems. The stability of certain relationships of counterfactual dependence and independence
across scientific models and real (or possible) systems enables scientists to justifiably use
idealized models that drastically distort difference-making features to understand the behaviors
of their real-world target system(s) (Batterman and Rice 2014; Rice 2017, 2018).
In many cases—e.g. the multiple conflicting models case described above—similar
patterns of counterfactual dependence will be displayed by systems with very different
components, interactions, and processes. In these cases, scientists often construct pervasively
distorted models that only include a few minimal features, but are amenable to the mathematical
modeling techniques they have available. For example, in many cases “the large-scale structure
is independent of a detailed description of the motion on the small scales. We can exploit this
kind of ‘universality’ by designing the most convenient ‘minimal model.’” (Goldenfeld and
Kadnoff 1999, 87). The resulting idealized model can then be used to investigate how changes in
various features of the system are counterfactually related to the phenomenon of interest. When
the idealized model is in the same universality class as the system(s) of interest, scientists can
justifiably use the idealized model to discover how changes to the features of the system would
result in changes to the phenomenon of interest (Rice 2017, 2018).
I want to conclude this section by briefly mentioning two important implications of
Understanding Realism that deserve to be explored in more detail than the space I have
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remaining allows. First, it is important to note that the body of modal information that constitutes
the scientific community’s current understanding of various phenomena has been contributed to
by multiple contradictory models and theories across time. Understanding Realism suggests that
just as multiple conflicting modeling approaches can each contribute to the production of factive
understanding by exploring different possible states of real systems, so too can conflicting
idealized models and theories used at different points in the history of science.18 That is, the
above arguments concerning the use of multiple conflicting models to understand the same
phenomenon might be used to show how past scientific representations that conflict with our
current models and theories can contribute to our current understanding of natural phenomena.
Along similar lines, Understanding Realism suggests that one of the best ways to improve
science’s overall (degrees of) understanding is through increased diversity of the kinds of
scientists (and non-scientists) and modeling approaches working to understand a phenomenon
(Longino 1990, 2002, 2013; Potochnik 2017; Solomon 2001). By incorporating the modal
information accessible by a more diverse range of scientific researchers and modeling
approaches over time—whose background assumptions, models, theories, and methods might be
in conflict—science will achieve a more complete understanding of natural phenomena than is
possible within the limitations of any single perspective. Both of these ideas have important
implications for the realism debate, but, given their complexity, a full treatment of them will
have to be provided elsewhere.

6. Conclusion

18

The challenge here is to say precisely which pieces of modal information ought to be retained across radical
changes to the models and theories adopted by the scientific community.
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I have argued that the fact that our best scientific models and theories are pervasively inaccurate
representations can be made compatible with a more nuanced form of scientific realism called
Understanding Realism. According to this view, science aims at and often achieves factive
understanding of natural phenomena by grasping true modal information. Moreover, the facticity
of this kind of understanding can be separated from the accuracy of the models and theories used
to produce it. Going forward, I suggest philosophers look more directly at the factive epistemic
achievements of scientific communities rather than focusing exclusively on the accuracy of our
current scientific models and theories. Often the best way to understand our world—and the
ways our world could be—is by having a diverse community of researchers construct multiple
conflicting models that each drastically distort the difference-making features of real systems.
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